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Anotace (Abstrakt)  
  
Bakalárska práca „The Neutrality and Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Sweden during the 
Second World War“ sa zaoberá vývojom neutrality Švédskeho kráľovstva počas Druhej 
svetovej vojny v závislosti na medzinárodnom vývoji a medzinárodnej politike vedenej zo 
Štokholmu. Časovo je zasadená najmä do obdobia konfliktu, ale obsahuje tiež historický 
exkurz do medzivojnového obdobia, ktoré je dôležité pre ďalšiu argumentáciu a vývoj témy. 
Je v ňom tiež obsiahnutá analýza Haagskej konvencie o neutralite z roku 1907, s ktorou 
porovnávam odchýlky, ktorých sa švédska vláda počas vojny dopustila. Práca sa zaoberá 
okrem popisu a analýzy zahraničnej politiky aj ekonomickým a obchodným potenciálom 
Švédska a jeho schopnosťou ozbrojenej obrany. Ďalej popisuje vzťahy Švédska k bojujúcim 
stranám v bezprostrednej blízkosti a ich vplyv na zahraničnú politiku. Na základe 








Bachelor thesis „The Neutrality and Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Sweden during the 
Second World War“ deals with the development of neutrality of Kingdom of Sweden during 
the Second World War depending on international development of affairs and foreign policy 
from Stockholm. Events are situated to the duration of conflict but it also contains historical 
excursion to inter-war period which is important for argumentation and further development 
of topic. Analysis of Hague Convention of 1907 is also included and it is compared with 
deviations of war-time foreign policy. Thesis deals not only with development of foreign 
policy but also with economic and trade potencial of Sweden and with ability of armed 
defence. Further it describes relations with billigerent powers in immidiate imminence and 
their effect on foreign policy. Based on argumets I had stated, policy of neutrality is evaluated 
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During World War II, the Kingdom of Sweden successfully avoided direct combat and turning 
its territory into a war area. The Scandinavian states had declared neutrality. However, Sweden was 
the only one that was able to maintain it. This was possible thanks to the flexible foreign policy and 
use of the given circumstances that created an island of freedom in an occupied Europe swept with 
war. Among its neighbours, Sweden is a unique example of state that led active neutrality policy in the 
inter-war period and during war and had contributed to the rebuilding of Europe after ceasing 
hostilities. 
 
After the First World War, Sweden had actively contributed to international policies focused 
on mediating conflicts and preventing similar military catastrophe that had just ended. It was closely 
cooperating with the rest of Europe within the League of Nations. After 1936, when this system of 
collective security had failed, Sweden refused to join any supranational emerging alliance. Because of 
its geopolitical position and international situation, Sweden resorted to declaration of neutrality that 
was supposed to prevent fighting on its territory. Neutrality has been a traditional value for Sweden 
since the end of Napoleonic Wars, last Swedish armed engagement in foreign territory. 
 
After the fighting started and German aggression made its way through Europe, Swedish 
foreign policy was influenced by several factors. Important conditions were Swedish involvement in 
interwar diplomacy and current position of the country on economic and geopolitical map of Europe. 
After the First World War, Sweden became dependent on international trade and on import from 
abroad, mainly of coal, coke and food while it exported iron, wood, industrial products, such as ball 
bearings or their parts. Geopolitically speaking, Sweden was one of the main actors engaged in 
European politics seeking mediation of conflicts during interwar period. It was an irreplaceable source 
of natural resources and industrial products for future combatant sides especially because of its high 
quality iron ore and ball bearings that were among the most quality products of their kind in the world. 
 
The moral dilemma of the performance during the Second World War was a characteristic 
phenomenon dividing Swedish society which considered itself as part of the western society. Sweden 
relied on armed neutrality focused on defence of its own territory but did not have the capacity to 
influence foreign military operations or to help its neighbours. Swedish help was only material and 
diplomatic, yet Sweden also tried to compromise with Germany and supported German military 
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What were the options of a small Nordic state that was not self-sustaining and was dependent 
on import of important commodities? What would have been a sense of being a part of the military 
conflict for the sake of defending democracy when their endeavours were not supported by world 
powers in the course of the interwar period? Was Swedish behaviour only opportunistic? This 
controversial era of Swedish history during the most destructive conflict of our times contains many 
questions.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the performance of Sweden during the Second World 
War. It focuses on foreign policy, especially development of the course of war events. In order to do 
so, first I have to introduce Sweden during interwar period; mainly its foreign policy, economic 
situation and strategic position in Europe‟s north. Consequently, I will introduce neutrality as a 
concept in international law so I can analyse and evaluate Sweden‟s neutral stance during the entire 
conflict under the circumstances of international situation. There are various perspectives on 
development of Sweden‟s neutrality which I will introduce and compare their differences with the 
assistance of historical data. Military insight is also important to see the possibilities of eventual 
defence against Wehrmacht. In the end of the paper I will try to answer following questions: “What 
were the options of  minor Nordic state that was not self-sustaining and was dependent on import of 
important commodities?”, “Would it have been reasonable to be a part of the military conflict for the 
sake of defending democracy when its endeavours were not supported by the League of Nations 
members during the interwar period?” or “Was Swedish behaviour opportunistic?”. 
 
In this thesis I will not focus on comparison of Swedish neutrality during the Second World 
War with that of Switzerland and of other neutral European countries. I will rather focus only on 
Swedish neutrality and its development aimed on foreign policy and international events. I used 
Swedish historical monographs in English and Polish language, journal articles of Swedish diplomats 
expressing their thoughts on policy of neutrality and economic publications and journals for additional 
data to back up any argumentation on Swedish-German war trade. I used lots of data on Swedish 
military capacity from historical monographs to back up another important argument, self-defence. I 
used Hague Convention of 1907 to introduce neutrality itself and analyse if Swedish politicians stuck 
to their obligation. In the end, I enclosed narrative development of Swedish neutrality and I think that 
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Swedish Foreign Policy before World War II 
 
Just after the end of the First World War, Sweden had found itself to be economically 
dependent on import from Europe and the United States. Foreign trade of goods was extremely 
important for its industry and population which suffered from food shortages and worker unrests. 
During the Entente‟s blockade of German coast, Sweden lost contact with its most important and 
closest trade partner. However, Hjalmar Hammarskjöld, Swedish prime minister from 1914 to 1917, 
was reluctant to bend rules of neutrality and open trade routes with Great Britain and her allies. 
Shortly after war, his actions caused social and economic problems, even hunger marches, due to 
damaged economy. In 1917- 1918 there were social democratic reforms, universal suffrage and 
parliamentary democracy reforms to strengthen social welfare of citizens and working class to 
withstand influence and ideological pressure from Russia. Question of financing social reforms versus 
defence spending was huge issue in Swedish parliament Riksdag. In the end, defence budget was 
stripped by one third which hit hard navy and 17 infantry regiments got disbanded in 1925. Per Albin 
Hansson‟s as Minister of War had vision of “Folkhemmet”; a fatherland for all Swedes and for that he 
needed resources for social reforms. This played huge role later during war where he was appointed as 
Prime Minister and architect of neutral policy, so it is logical that he was unwilling to abandon 




The character of economy dependent on import was one of the arguments against isolationist 
policy that was popular among rightist parties. Conservatives, with their leader Hjalmar 
Hammarskjöld, were concerned that if Sweden joins the League of Nations, it will be forced to take 
part in sanctions against Germany because of the Versailles system treaty, with which the Swedish did 
not agree. They sympathised with the Triple Entente at the end of the war, yet Swedish Prime Minister 
Hjalmar Branting said in 1923: “Surround Germany... Treat it as a madman of Europe, take any action 
against it, and one day, Germany will escape its cage with fury of a madman”
2
 he quite closely 
predicted the future development. 
 




 March 1920 
and Stockholm was ready to break the foundation of their neutrality in order to join the organization of 
collective security that contradicted the neutrality
3
. Swedish politicians became actively involved in 
                                                 
1
 John Gilmour, Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin: The swedish experience in the Second World War, (Edinburgh 
University Press, 2011), p. 35. 
2
Cited according to Franklin D. Scott, Sweden Nation's History, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, c1988), p.501. 
3
 Swedish Neutrality and Its Abadonment, http://www.iticu.edu.tr/yayin/dergi/s11/M00167.pdf, p. 185. 
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policy-making of conflict mediation within the League of Nations such as the solution of Turkish-Iraqi 
border dispute in 1924. They viewed this policy as a possible alternative of defence for a small state 
surrounded by great powers. Part of the League of Nations involvement was support of right to self-
determination of new founded states in Europe. On eastern parts of borders of Sweden rose Finland 
and Poland but most important, Baltic States. These states were important as buffer regions for 
traditional enemy- Russia. 
 
However, as soon as  1919, Swedish sense for abiding valid treaties was put through a difficult 
test because of decision of the League of Nations to cede Åland Islands to Finland. Its population who 
spoke Swedish, decided in petition in 1919 to secede from Finland. Even though Sweden did not agree 
with this, it conformed to the decision of the League of Nations. 
 
During the 1930s, Swedish politicians were regularly disappointed by actions of the League of 
Nations. Among these actions was French occupation of Saarland, Italian action against Corfu in 
1920s, unsuccessful disarmament conference in Geneva in 1932, Japanese invasion to Manchuria in 
1931-32 and the attack of Fascist Italy against Ethiopia in 1935. They disagreed with all these actions 
in the frame of the League of Nations and they were not identifying with idleness of great powers that 
could not overcome their differences and cooperated instead. Sweden became more and more aware 





Therefore, in 1936, Sweden eventually began to actively prepare its defence. Military alliance 
of the entire Scandinavia failed mainly because the individual states had different interests and 
different enemies. There was possibility to tie Baltic States into alliance but it failed because of many 
differences between possible members. Denmark shared borders with Germany, Finland and Baltic 
States with the Soviet Union. Sweden and Norway were close to Great Britain. Further alliance could 
not focus on one enemy and allied itself with other Great power. It became useless and nobody wanted 
to side and was not even prepared to side in possible conflict. Attempt to remilitarize Åland Islands 
was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Moscow was also in favour of Scandinavian neutrality because of 
closer ties with Germany than with them. Neutral trade, shortage of allies and demilitarized Åland 
Islands were aims of Soviet support of Scandinavian neutral alliance.  
 
Finally in 1938, the Nordic states declared neutrality and ceased to take part in policies of the 
League of Nations. In Sweden, defence was actively prepared, although there were struggles between 
politicians about investment in defence or social programme and this caused greatest problems and 
                                                 
4
 Franklin D. Scott, Sweden Nation's History, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, c1988), p.501. 
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delays. Denmark, in contrast, invested its resources only in social policy and Norway did only very 




The approach of Western powers‟ appeasement against the aggressive politics of Hitler and 
Mussolini, the steps adopted by Sweden‟s neighbours, their interwar diplomatic endeavours and fear 
of social restlessness and the memory of material shortage from the First World War were other facts 
that affected the decision-making of its politicians in the formulation of its foreign policy in the 
following years. 
 
Swedish Economic Potential 
 
 Scandinavian region went through distinct change and development since the end of the First 
World War. It economically strengthened, the number of citizens rose, the emigration numbers fell 
down. These states even ranked high in world economic charts. They had one of the biggest trade 
fleets and in 1933, Sweden and Norway controlled, thanks to their forests, 24% of world pulp 
production, 16% of wood production and 6% of paper production. Together with Denmark, they were 
responsible for a huge part of world bacon production and a quarter of production of butter and eggs. 
In 1936, the population of Scandinavia rose to 12 million and it rated as fourth biggest importer in the 
world
6
.  Sweden particularly imported coal for heating, up to 6 500 000 tons per year, coke for the 
industry, food and “colonial” goods, such as coffee that was very popular in Sweden. 
 
Because there are only few coalmines on the Swedish territory, practically all coal had to be 
imported. Coal was bought in Germany, where 75% of overall Swedish export of iron ore went to. 
During the 1830‟s, Great Britain bought 12% of Swedish iron ore at most. Since 1927, the Gränsberg 
Law limited the amount of iron ore export to 9 million tons per year. This limit only rose, except for 




Export of iron ore, together with ball bearings, was the most controversial question during the 
war because it directly supported German military industry. On the other hand, because of its 
geographic position, Sweden did not have any other option than to trade with Germany. Especially, 
after the occupation of Denmark and Norway that meant brake of contact with the West. Questions 
emerged after the war were: To what extent did Swedish support the German military industry?  
                                                 
5
 Gilmour, Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin: The swedish experience in the Second World War, p. 45. 
6
 Scott, Sweden Nation's History, p.503. 
7
 Scott, Sweden Nation's History, p.503. 
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Would it have been able to limit or stop the course of war with restrictions of export? And finally did 
Germany exploit monopolistic position towards Sweden? 
 
The iron ore exported to Germany contained an order of magnitude higher proportion of iron 
than the ore that Germany controlled before the war. This situation lasted until 1940 when Germany 
occupied French mines and was therefore able to cover part of the import from Sweden with these 
resources. But with occupation of Czechoslovakian and Polish mines and later French coal resources, 
Germans were unable to maintain pre-war levels of production and coal shortages became imminent 





Regarding trade relations between Sweden and Germany, Hedberg and Håkansson are 
examining in their paper trade of coal, iron ore and paint between Germany and Sweden on the bases 
of interwar and wartime prices. They reached conclusion that Gemany, in this relationship, did not 
exploit this position even though it was dominant. Instead of that, prices showed that Germans, in this 
crucial part of interstate trade, were prefering stability in prices and relations. Hedberg and 




In the case of Germany and Great Britain, Swedish ball bearings from the SKF Company were 
fundamental for production of engines, planes, ships, tanks and a wide scale of other vehicles. SKF 
had its branches in Germany, in Great Britain and in the United States. The original company was 
situated in Sweden, from where it exported high quality material, production devices and know-how. 
It owned patents for processing ball bearings of the highest quality. During the war, 31% of production 
in Great Britain and 58% of production in Germany originated from this company.  In his article, Eric 
B. Golson analyses the relations between Sweden, Germany and Great Britain and concludes that even 
though the import and production of this commodity drove German weapon industry, its stopping 
would not overturn the course of the war. After several months, both sides would be able to alter the 
missing production, even though it would be logistically and materially demanding. Therefore, the 
                                                 
8
 Peter Hedberg and Elias Håkansson, The Nature of German Interwar and Wartime Trande Policies Reloaded: 
The Swedish- German case, (paper presented at the XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki 21 to 
25 August 2006, Session 91, The Nordic countries and the commercial de-globalization of the interwar period), p. 
11-12. 
9
 Hedberg and Håkansson, The Nature of German Interwar and Wartime Trande Policies Reloaded: The 
Swedish- German case, p. 16. 
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course of the war would be merely slowed down by Sweden which would risk German intervention 




In the case of alliance with Western Allies, Sweden would be in danger of possible occupation 
or siege of its cities, starving and freezing, for it was not a materially independent country. But 
considering possibility of exploitation of trade link from Germany, we can say, there was no such 
thing. Hitler was focused on many other more important wartime issues so it was important to 
maintain economic peace in the North. We can find similarity in trade between Germany and Balkan 
states focused on meat. They were seeking peaceful trade partner but after Italy‟s attack on Balkans 
they were forced to maintain military actions which disrupted this trade and tied lots of Germany‟s 
military potential. 
 
  These were important arguments that did not allow or did not require Sweden to expose itself 
to direct involvement in the conflict. The Swedish government was aware of this and was not pleased 
by the fact that they disposed of commodities that were so immensely important for Germany but their 
options were very restricted. 
 
 Concept of Neutrality 
 
 
There are two types of neutrality – temporary and permanent. Temporary neutrality is 
unilaterally declared by a state that does not want to take part in a military conflict while in the case of 
permanent neutrality, the state in question declares its neutrality via international treaties, such as in 
the case of Switzerland since 1815 or it has its neutrality embedded in the constitution which is 




Since 1814, Sweden had not taken part in any military conflict; the last combat operations 
took place in Swedish Finland in 1808. These clashes had only small character and neutrality was 
declared right after the Napoleonic Wars. However, the Swedish neutrality was temporary but not 
continuous since the end of the Napoleonic Wars; it was at least twice interrupted – in 1864 during the 
Prussian-Austrian-Danish War Sweden did declare war but did not take part in combat. During the 
                                                 
10
 Eric B. Golson, Did Swedish Ball Bearings Keep the Second War Going? 
http://www.econhist.gu.se/digitalAssets/1341/1341645_golson.pdf 
11
 Zdeněk Hojda, Jako ježek v nebezpečí. Klikaté cesty švédské neutrality za druhé světové války  (Dějiny a 
současnost 31, 2009), p.1. 
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Winter War at the turn of 1939 between Finland and Soviet Union Sweden declared itself as non-
fighting country so they could provide material and diplomatic help to their eastern neighbour
12
. Non-
belligerence allows country to support one belligerent side in conflict without any official participation 
in combat but this stance contradicts Hague Convention of 1907
13
. In this case, Swedish leaders chose 
to officially abolish neutrality for duration of the Winter War. 
 
However, the neutrality itself was not a perfect strategy to keep the country out of military 
conflicts. Between the 19th century and the World War II, this doctrine had gone through minimum of 
tests that would make it as concept an effective argument in international politics. It had a character of 
theoretical juridical concept. Swedish politician and diplomat Gunnar Hägglöf talks about the 
insecurity of neutrality. He recognizes Balance of power policy; therefore he conditions successful 
neutrality on equilibrium in international great power relations that makes the ground for international 
policy
14
. This is valid especially for small states with limited military resources that secured their 
impartiality with balancing between two powers. In contrast to a stable division of the fighting parties 
in Europe during the First World War, the events predating the beginning of the World War II – 
signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and merging of the Communist and Fascist fractions into one – 
directly affected concept of division of fighting powers and simultaneously the concept of neutrality. It 
thus became harder for smaller states to oppose the big military powers, to use the balances in 
international politics and to maintain their independence in case of its possible breaking. Kingdom of 
Sweden avoided this due to the systematic building of defence with which it could directly support its 




Another issue is whether state declaring neutrality will be recognised by belligerents. As it 
happened in many cases through history of 20
th
 century, neutrality, without but also with support of 
stronger partner, was trampled on. As an example could serve Belgian neutrality backed by Great 
Britain but exploited and broken by second German Empire that turned Belgian lands in war area 
against their will. We can assume that success of neutrality is limited and it is very easy to violate. 
 
 In 1938, Per Albin Hansson as Prime Minister said in Oslo that Social Democrat party is not 
prepared to hold absolute neutrality of Sweden. They must look further than neutrality, have to make 
right decision in case that neutrality would fail and would have to choose sides
16
. 
                                                 
12




 M. Gunnar Hagglof, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 
Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr., 1960), p. 153-167. 
15
 Hagglof, International Affairs, p. 153-167. 
16
 Gilmour, Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin: The swedish experience in the Second World War, p. 14. 
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In the case of the Swedish Kingdom; its neutrality was armed. Systematic building of defence 
has proved to be effective mean to turn down potential attackers. Its level, though not high, together 
with natural conditions were believed to manage to hold off the German attack in the beginning of the 
war
17
. Swedish defence capacity had risen to the level that, together with development of international 
situation, enabled change in the attitude of Swedish politicians towards Germany and the level of their 
mutual trade.  
 
 
Neutrality as concept was characterised by certain rules bound by sovereign countries 
claiming to be neutral in military conflict. Some of these rules were broken during the Second World 
War by Sweden still claiming to be bound by its rules, such as not allowing belligerent troops to travel 
through neutral territory or provide war material to belligerent armies. I will discuss these exceptions 
in further chapters and I will provide historical data showing reasons behind this behaviour. 
 
 
A Potential Theater of War 
 
 
Sweden‟s geopolitical character was of a small country fixated on continental Europe, 
especially Germany which was able to break connections of Scandinavia with the West and in case of 
conflict it would be possible that they will control the whole Baltic Sea. Foreign trade was vital for 
Sweden, therefore its manoeuvring space in foreign policy was considerably reduced. With the need of 
strong war fleet and maintaining trade relations with Scandinavia, Germany had to gain control of the 
Baltic Sea in case of conflict. It would accomplish this by occupying Danish straits and Norwegian 
coast which would then shield the whole Scandinavia from the British influence. The British viewed 
Norway as a gun pointed on their belly. During the entire war, after their loss in Narvik, British 
command was pondering the idea of Norwegian invasion and have fixated the Wehrmacht‟s 25th 
armoured division in Norway. 
  
Economic and geopolitical importance of Swedish export was enormously significant for the 
Third Reich, which counted with the Baltic Sea blockade in case of war. The significance was so high 
that the upper echelons of German command did not rule out the possibility of a military action 
                                                 
17
 Scott, Sweden Nation's History, p.513. 
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against this region which would ensure the necessary supply of products and materials, should the 




At the beginning of war, Scandinavia was at risk of becoming the first site of greater clashes. 
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had shaken the whole international system of the time, particularly in 
Northern Europe. Finland, attacked by the Soviet Union, received material, financial, diplomatic and 
volunteer aid from Sweden. During this conflict, the relations in the North were quite tense because 
many Western powers sympathised with stubborn Finnish struggle. Great Britain and France started 
pondering military intervention and they tried to aggressively put this idea through Scandinavian 
governments. They met with resistance because Scandinavians did not want to drag themselves to war. 
Moreover, this action could infringe Swedish and Norwegian neutrality, as well as directly endanger 
German supply of iron ore which would undoubtedly provoke Germany to take action. As was already 
mentioned, Swedish iron ore was extremely important for Germany. To ensure its supply, Germany 
even considered military action. According to this possible scenario, the Soviets and Germans would 
probably divide Finland and Sweden between themselves in the beginning of World War II which 
would probably strengthen the alliance predicted by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The concern about 
this development intensified the friction in Northern Europe that lasted until the signing of the peace 
treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union- the end of the Winter War. 
 
Gunnar Hägglöf, a Swedish diplomat, heavily criticized the inconsiderate course of the Allies 
during the first phase of the war, as well as the friction that led to Operation Weserübung. In his 
studies, he blames the Allies for the attack on Norway and Denmark and he points to the legacy of 




Sweden during the Second World War and phases of its Neutrality 
 
 
When Poland was attacked and the Second World War started, Sweden and its neighbours 
reacted with declaration of neutrality. In the case of Sweden, this neutrality was at least once infringed 
and it was bended several times to avoid a military conflict. In the case of its neighbours, their 
neutrality was ignored and aggressively broken by the Soviet Union and Germany. Swedish policy 
was changing during the whole conflict which was influenced by the events of the inter-war period 
                                                 
18
 Tadeusz Konecki, Skandynawia w drugiej wojnie światowej: od neutralności i pacyfizmu do militaryzmu i 
wyścigu zbrojeń. (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 2003), p. 13. 
19
 Hagglof, International Affairs, p. 158. 
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and events during the war era. Even though the public and the government sympathised with the 





Swedish policy of neutrality was transformed during the conflict; sometimes, it was even 
crossing its borders. The tendencies of foreign policy can be divided to different phases which are set 
by important events. These events caused a turn in the war and a possibility of geopolitical change in 
immediate proximity of Sweden which had to be quickly reacted upon by Swedish politicians. Some 
of the authors connect these phases and some divide them– it depends on the opinion on importance of 
the events that affected the development of Swedish foreign policy. 
 
Joachim divides this era to four phases. The first one starts with the attack on Poland and ends 
with the beginning of the Winter War. The second phase follows, ending with German attack on 
Denmark and Norway in 1940. During the third phase, Sweden virtually became Germany‟s ally until 
the turn in the war which happened, according to Joachim, in the beginning of 1943 when Wehrmacht 
lost at Stalingrad and in northern Africa. Joachim dates the fourth and last phase from this turn to the 
end of the war and characterizes it with Swedish moving towards the West. This division observes the 




Nordstrom uses similar division but, contrary to Joachim, he connects Joachim‟s first and 
second phase and divides his third one. This division follows the development of neutrality more than 
the policies in general. In the first phase, he views Sweden as neutral even though it declared itself as a 
non-fighting country in the case of Finland while Joachim distinguishes between these two terms. 
Nordstrom does not consider the battle of Stalingrad and the fights in Northern Africa to be so 
important and outstanding events that could change the whole course of Swedish politics. He regards 
the summer of 1944 as a turning point during which Sweden became more and more an ally of the 




I will divide this period into 5 phases because I consider the Winter War and the summer of 
1944 to be important international events that influenced the course of Swedish politics. All the 
aforementioned events meant an impulse from abroad that was reacted on by Swedish politicians so 
they had to lead a balanced policy of armed neutrality and compromise with Germany to prevent being 
a target of future German expansion. This policy shifted according to important turning points during 
                                                 
20
 Konecki, Skandynawia w drugiej wojnie światowej: od neutralności i pacyfizmu do militaryzmu i wyścigu 
zbrojeń, p. 21. 
21
 Joesten Joachim, Phases in Swedish Neutrality, (Foreign Affairs; January 1945, Vol. 23 Issue 2), p. 324-329. 
22
 Byron J. Nordstrom, Scandinavia since 1500, (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 315-317. 
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the war; Sweden was basically buying the time to build their defence and to be able to avoid future 
possibility of intervention. The compromises guaranteed to the Third Reich were of little military 
importance; except for the guarantee to transfer a whole Engelbrecht division consisting of 15,000 
troops which crossed Sweden‟s mainland in trains on the way from Norway to Finland and to the 
Eastern Front. When the threat from German side passed over, trade treaties were cancelled and 
Germany lost a source of natural resources. 
 
In general, Operation Barbarossa is not considered as turning point in the history of Swedish 
neutrality. They were never asked to join attack as other German allies and satellites. German attitude 
did not change, it just continued from events during Operation “Wesserübung“ and no major 
concessions were demanded. The fact that Sweden was not in camp of allies and satellites after 
complete isolation, could be considered as a result of flexible foreign policy. On the other hand, trade 
with iron ore was uninterrupted so Germany took from this relationship reasonable maximum it 
needed to support her war machine to launch attack on east. 
 
During the keeping balance in relation with Germany, Sweden created an enclave in Europe 
controlled by Nazis; thousands of war refugees and European Jews found asylum there. The Swedish 
actively worked within humanitarian missions during which they negotiated with Germany about 
transferring the prisoners of war and they saved many lives. This argument is significantly inclined to 









The tense international situation that preceded the attack on Poland affected the entire 
Scandinavia that was threatened only indirectly, yet it closely observed the whole development. In 
July 1939, the Swedish attaché in Warsaw informed his superiors about the attitude of Polish 
Government towards German danger. He claimed that the Third Reich does not have such military 
power to risk guilt from breakdown of another armed conflict. The news about signing the Molotov-
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 The first phase of the war, called “phony war” or “Sitzkrieg”, lasted from 1st September to the 
30th November 1939, beginning of the Winter War. During this phase, Sweden announced the 
declaration of neutrality based on the Hague Convention from 1907. The defence expenses had risen 
and the government had taken a rigorously neutral stand, even though they sympathised with the 
Allies. The attack on Poland and its minimal possibilities of defence were perceived as another failure 
of western allies. Swedish media started commenting this inaction, even though the government tried 
to limit them in order to preserve the neutrality and to remain impartial. The constraint of media, a 





The attack of the Soviet Union on neutral Finland, Swedish reaction and shift in its attitude 








 After Soviet Union‟s pressure on Baltic states, its claim on territories in Karelia and the lease 
of bases in Hanko peninsula that would directly threaten Finnish capital Helsinki, the whole North 
joined together. It refused the Russian conditions and declared its solidarity with Finland, even though 
no military obligations were adopted. 
 
The alleged Finnish artillery attack near the village of Mainila on the Soviet Union border 
guards started a conflict that put Sweden into a position where its traditional enemy attacked Finland 
which shared its history and its minority with Sweden; Sweden also considered Finland to be its buffer 
state. Denmark and Norway declared their neutrality immediately after the attack while Sweden broke 
its neutrality and claimed to be a non-belligerent country.  
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This status enabled Sweden to indirectly support fighting Finland by official tolerance of 8000 
trained volunteers that departed from Sweden to fight in Finnish front lines
26
, by emptying half of its 
ammunition storages and even by money collection among its citizens that gained 500 million 




Finnish struggle against any odds was admired all around the world, yet the sending of 
effective military aid depended only on Sweden and Norway. The access from the South was blocked 
by Germany and from North by the Soviet Union. The only possible way led through the neutral and 
non-belligerent countries that had to give their permission for such an action.  The official offer to 
transfer and strengthen the Finnish forces with their divisions came from Great Britain and France, yet 
it never happened. Sweden also considered the occupation and fortification of Åland Islands but it 
dismissed this idea for the concern of strong Soviet reaction that was limited during the time to official 
protest notes concerning the Swedish support of Finland. On 13th March 1940, after breaking Finnish 
defence and endangering  Helsinki, it was eventually possible to sign a peace treaty between Finland 




Despite the pressure of interventionists and their motto: “Finland‟s case is ours!” the 
government resisted to participate in the conflict because of the adverse international situation. Further 
political energy of critics of government was diverted in activism in favour of the Finnish which gave 
Swedish government space for negotiating truce to stabilize the region. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
that created a non-aggression alliance between the Soviet Union and Germany, was already in effect 
during the time of the conflict and it was quite possible that after Swedish taking part in combat, this 
relationship would strengthen. Sweden would then be at risk of possible invasion that would be 
impossible to resist for a longer period of time. Even if the Allies came to aid Sweden, its territory 




Sweden did not allow the transfer of French and British troops, mainly because of fear that 
Germany could understand this act as a declaration of war and a possible threat to the supply of 
Swedish iron ore. The possibility of fighting on Swedish territory was vigorously refused even when 
the defence of Western democratic countries was in question because of their active endeavour to 
build and keep collective security and their frustration with the attitude of Western powers and with 
their foreign policy overall. 
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Swedish political attitude changed after Germany had attacked Denmark and Norway. These 
states were not prepared for aggression of any kind, unlike Sweden which was systematically building 
its defence. Sweden once again found itself under pressure to decide whether to intervene or to hold to 





Phase Three: From the Attack on Denmark and Norway 1940 to the 
War Turning Point in 1943 
  
 Germany planned to attack the North so they could precede British and French in actions in 
Scandinavia. Also British actions in coast of Norway and aspirations to disrupt Swedish iron ore 
export to Germany could be counted as a reason why Hitler decided to execute operation 
“Weserübung”. Sweden was again in danger of being dragged into war. Even though Swedish 
diplomatic dispatches reported the concentration of German troops in Baltic harbours, they stated that 
Sweden is not directly threatened. Despite this information, Swedish troops were transferred to the 
South of the country to fortify the observation posts. Considerable resources began to be set from the 




On 9th April 1940, Germany started Operation Weserübung, attack on Denmark and Norway. 
Wehrmacht demonstrated its power during blitzkrieg on Poland and nobody expected anything else in 
case of attack on Denmark and Norway even in case of armed resistance. After evaluating its situation 
and the defence possibilities of the two states, Sweden declared neutrality. This happened on 17th June 
1940 after the talk between Bjorn Prytz, a Swedish ambassador in London, and R. A. Butler, British 
under-secretary of Foreign Affairs in which they agreed that Great Britain would make a separate 
peace with Germany as soon as the conditions were stable. Bjorn Prytz sent this information to 
Stockholm
31
. The neutral status of Sweden was supported even by Norwegian government that viewed 
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When Germany advanced through Norway, Sweden found itself in an uncomfortable position. 
It was surrounded by German army and air forces in Norway and German navy in Skagerrak. 
Stockholm lost its contact with the West that served as possible military and diplomatic insurance of 
Swedish neutrality. Allies de-facto retreated from Baltic Sea militarily and diplomatically. Because of 
this situation, Germany has been in position where Hitler could have made various claims to Swedish 
government backed by invasion of their neighbours. Ribbentrop-Molotov pact just strengthened 
Germany‟s position. In case of armed resistance and war declaration from whole Scandinavia it would 
be possible that Hitler and Stalin would divide and conquer this area according to their sphere of 
influence. 
 
 Germany demanded particularly the opening of railways to transport soldiers and military 
material to the North, to Narvik and Trondheim, to support the invasion. Even though the Swedish 
government resisted these demands, it eventually had to partially fulfil them. Swedish leaders found 
themselves in impossible position where they could only delay German influence in form of 
concessions
33
.   
 
Only a transport of humanitarian aid for German soldiers in British siege beyond Narvik was 
agreed on. However, Norway argued that some military material was smuggled into the country along 
with the aid; this claim was not officially affirmed by Sweden. This compromise was accepted with 
awareness that it directly infringes the neutrality convention that Sweden assigned to. Nevertheless, it 
was necessary to ease the German pressure. The transports could help the German army to break the 
siege in Narvik and to end the campaign in Norway. While compromising with Germany, Sweden 
accepted Norwegian soldiers in their borders, despite of German protests. Questionable was whether 
Wehrmacht would stop after conquering Norway which was unclear and Sweden had to prepare to 
deal with this threat or prevent this possibility. It is true that Germans feared possible defeat at Narvik 
so they desperately needed support from Sweden, even though limited. Swedes agreed only on 
concessions of humanitarian help and supplies because there was no possible way to aid Wehrmacht 
militarily when they were fighting Norwegians.  
 
In May 1940, the Netherlands and Belgium, neutral countries, backed by Great Britain and 
France, were attacked. Their neutrality was inconsiderately violated so Swedish concessions were 
based on fear and actual events that could happened at their home soil. Germany was able to force 
concessions not only by invasion but also by attack on main Swedish urban areas. These were 
defenceless against Luftwaffe air attacks due to almost non-existent fighter air force. On top of that, 
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Sweden‟s military situation and supplies were on bad level. Baltic States had been invaded by Soviet 
Union, dividing of sphere of influence continued. In light of these events, German concessions 
practically changed to ultimatums. Swedish leaders had very little space to negotiate and manoeuvre. 
Bilateral meetings changed to how to concede rather than whether to concede. In the conclusion, 
negotiations with Germany about concessions seemed to be the most reasonable way of action based 




In the last days of Norwegian campaign, Sweden almost succeeded in negotiating its own 
occupying zone around Narvik that would be under Swedish, not German control. However, the treaty 
that was signed 3rd June 1940 in Luleå was not ratified by the Germans because Norwegian 
government fled to London and the overall situation changed. After being allowed to transport medical 
material, Germany again started to put pressure on Sweden and to demand further usage of Swedish 
connection to the North and the middle part of Norway. They wanted to transfer a part of the invasion 
army on this route, leaving only occupation forces in Norway. Swedish government resisted this 
demand but eventually gave in because of the international situation and growing power of 
Wehrmacht.  
 
 At time of further negotiations, Germany celebrated victories all over the Western Europe, 
Belgium and the Netherlands surrendered, Paris was captured and Italy joined the conflict. It seemed 




The negotiations of 5th July 1940 resulted in so-called “leave traffic” which were three 
railway routes on which German soldiers could be evacuated. On these routes operated a limited 
number of trains that were used by the German army. They connected Kornsjö on southern Swedish-
Norwegian borders with Helsingborg where ferries were dispatched, Narvik with Helsingborg and 
Trondheim with Narvik through Swedish territory. This connection was called “horseshoe traffic”. 
Sweden insisted that the soldiers must travel unarmed, only with bayonets while officers were allowed 
to have a personal gun. There could be maximum of 500 soldiers per train so that they would be 
unable to engage hostilities while on Swedish territory. Train schedule was also limited. Route Narvik- 
Trondheim, used mainly to support Narvik operations, could be dispatched once per week, as well as 
route Kornsjö –Trelleborg near Malmö and then ferry ride to Germany. Swedes also made sure that 
incoming forces at least matched outgoing so Germans would not build up the number of soldiers in 
Norway. All armaments were to be loaded to the train cars behind the soldiers. However, this 
condition was not always satisfied. After the Operation Barbarossa started on 22th June 1941, Sweden 
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was addressed with another demand – to allow a transfer of whole Engelbrecht infantry division from 
Norway through Sweden to Finland. Riksdag agreed with this demand, claiming that it is an aid for 
fighting Finland which was dragged into the attack on the Soviet Union and that it was only one-time 
exception
36
. Strengthened east borders with German troops also ceased need for Sweden to enter war 
and sent soldiers to Finland.  Thus, Sweden made another compromise for Germany that was at the top 
of its military strength and was building up forces on east. 
 
General Olof Thörnell, the leader of Swedish military forces, argued in his government report 
from 1942 that it would be only logical for Swedish army to take part in the German campaign and to 
help to defeat the Soviet Union. The reasons of General Thörnell for this claim were strengthening of 
the Eastern border, ensuring of Finnish position and keeping the war out of Swedish territory, for 
everything indicated that Germany was going to win the war. On the one hand, Sweden sympathised 
with Nazi Germany that was endeavouring to suppress Bolshevism. On the other hand, pragmatic 
Swedes were not content with exploitation and infringement of international agreements and treaties 
which was a common practice in Germany. But General Thörnell never really insisted on taking part 





The public opinion was on the side of the Allies  mirrored to the open criticism of 
compromises with Germany, mainly condemning  the transfer of the Engelbrecht division
38
. The 
officers were mostly pro-German and Hitler was well aware of this fact, being able to use it in case of 
attacking Sweden. During this most questionable phase of neutrality that was inclined towards 
Germany, Swedish government had to influence the domestic media to preserve the unanimous course 
of foreign policy. The government act from 1940 enabled the government to confiscate an issue of any 
magazine or newspaper that could irritate a foreign power
39
. During those years, Swedish elite 
believed that Germany would win the war; therefore it was in their interest to maintain the best 
possible relations, even though Sweden was under the constant threat of occupation. 
They maintained the relations not only by balanced compromising policies but also by strong defence 
that was systematically built since 1936. With limited inner censorship, they wanted to force the media 
and the public opinion to become neutral as well because in the beginning of 1943, the German 
invasion seemed more than likely to happen and flexible foreign policy was the only way how to 
prevent it.  
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Swedish foreign trade was almost exclusively focused on Germany in this phase, even though 
Sweden was initially able to have minimal trade connection with Great Britain which was later being 
ceased by Germany. Export and import of isolated Sweden could be oriented only towards Germany 
where Sweden exported its iron ore and ball bearings while Germany supplied its need of coal for 
heating and coke for industrial purposes. Without these imported goods, the country would face 
closing of factories, social disorders and freezing of the population because logging was not large 
enough to satisfy the need for heating materials. The SKF Company exported ready-made ball 
bearings that were very valuable for Germany, as well as iron ore that could have been exported 
without infringing the neutrality status in international law. It was therefore more of a moral problem 
because Sweden indirectly supported German military industry to avoid occupation
40
. Even though the 




During the period between April 1940 and summer 1943, Sweden had to overpass and 
overdraw the limits of its neutrality in order to avoid German retaliatory action. Although it is possible 
that Sweden agreed on “leave traffic” and the transportation of the Engelbrecht division could weaken 
German contingent in Norway and lower down the possibility of military action against Sweden in 
1943, the attack from Norway was the most probable. However, these transports were not of large 
military importance, only one infantry division was transported. It was more a question of legal and 
moral integrity and political concessions
42
. German leaders were many times dissatisfied with Sweden 
attitude towards new order in Europe set by them. What were Swedish defence options and did 
Sweden have a realistic chance to defend itself against German invasion?  
 
 
Options of Swedish Military Defence 
 
 
Ability of Sweden to protect itself was  very important argument which supported whole 
policy of armed neutrality. Development and composition of defence forces is thus important aspect of 
ability to deter or resist any possible violation of Swedish neutral status.  
 
Swedish defence budget was rising since the League of Nations abandoned their sanctions 
policy during the inter-war period. It rose from 50 million USD in 1938 to 400 million USD in the 
following year and then to 600 million USD at the end of the war. Swedish forces were permanently 
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embattled. The army of 600 000 men, as well as 110 000 women in voluntary units called Lotta Corps, 
had to mobilize several times due to international events that endangered Sweden. This of course 
brought failures in workforce on farms, factories and in woods that was needed to gain timber for 
heating because the import of coal from Germany could be stopped at any time. The official order in 
case of invasion stated in the official government statement “Directions for citizens of Kingdom in the 
event of war”
43
, was to fight occupants and in any case cease the resistance. 
 
From interwar period, there were four possible scenarios of attack on Sweden, three from 
Russia, one very unlikely from Germany. Because of threat from the East, Åland Islands, very close to 
Stockholm and Finnish Turku, played important role in securing entrance to Gulf of Bothnia and were 
very important issue for Swedish interwar period foreign policy. In the end, islands were demilitarized 
and remilitarization was many times attempted but never executed. Defence scenarios and thus policy 





General preparedness of Swedish armed forces was quite poor considering of how big capacity  
German or Russian armed forces were. But in contrast to Norwegian and Danish forces they possessed 
capability to resist possible attack with more success. Major weakness which haunted Swedish high 
command was lacking of air-force capable of defending urban areas. In the beginning of war, there 
were 150 obsolete biplanes which could not be even compared with Luftwaffe or Russian air-force. 
Only anti-air regiments were capable to deploy on frontiers and protect Swedish air space but they did 
not possess equipment and training to fight night bombing raids so their effectiveness was 
questionable in case of full scale air attack. Infantry received training during war years and were 
planned to be deployed in same manner as Finnish infantry in case of Karelia against Russians. 
Artillery regiments were equipped with obsolete guns and they had no anti-tank capacity in the 
beginning of war. Navy had obsolete battle cruisers and small submarine fleet focused on patrolling 
coast and defending cities. Reviews on Sweden‟s military defence capability were sent to Germany on 
regular basis and only few times they exaggerated actual stance. 
 
Huge amount of the resources was aimed to re-arm, train and expand armed forces so they 
could deter any possible violation of Swedish neutral stance. Purchasing big machines of war, such as 
ships, planes and tanks was huge problem. Before blockade, planes and war material was ordered and 
bought in the United States but for their military production the priority was to arm Great Britain, thus 
Sweden‟s order was never met. After 1940 and the blockade of Skagerrak, it was impossible to import 
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arms without intervention of Germany and Great Britain. Great Britain did not want strong armed 
Sweden after concessions made after fall of Narvik and they confiscated four destroyers bought in 
Italy by Swedes anchored in Faroe Islands. Germany, on the other hand, sold some military equipment 
to Sweden for iron ore shipments. But they also did not want armed neutral country with ties to Allies 
on their borders. Investment in home arms production followed. Companies as Husquarna, Volvo and 
Ericsson were involved and produced vehicles and other military equipment. AB Bofors continued 
with production of artillery guns and SAAB Company invested in development and production of new 
fighter planes. Over 70 new, mostly light, ships were assembled in dockyards to strengthen navy 
capacity. As soon as it was possible, purchases from the United States resumed and Sweden could 
strengthen their air-force with new Mustang fighter-bombers. 
 
Similar to foreign policy and development of neutrality, strategy, tactics and overall armed 
capability were shaped by war events and immediate threats. In 1939 at the beginning of the Winter 
War, Commander –in-Chief, General Olof Thörnell pushed for deployment of Swedish troops in 
Finland to counter their traditional enemy outside of their territory. This request was never met and 
help to Finland was only political and humanitarian. Sweden as non-belligerent, not neutral state 
allowed sending volunteers, medical supplies, arms and ammunition which in conclusion weakened 
their own defence ability. Troops were sent to Norrland, land border between Finland and Sweden to 
resist possible Russian advance towards iron ore mines. They even assembled and provided airplanes 
from west to Finnish battlefronts. Germany, due to peace pact with Soviet Union was unable to 
provide arms to Finland, the only possibility for resupply was therefore only from west. Ceasing 
hostilities in Finland was important for stability in region and to replenish ammunition warehouses and 




In the eve of Operation “Wesserübung“, Swedish defence undergone another fearfull moment. 
Altough it was clear that German building up of troops on German Baltic coast will not attack 
Sweden, armed forces went to full alert. In 1940, possibility of German assault could hit west coast 
around city of Göteborg, thus defensive line, also known as “Per-Albin Line”(Per Albin Hansson) was 
built and garrisoned. But in event of attack on Norway, it was only lightly occupied and lacked large 
numbers of armament like machineguns. Conscripts were mobilized and started to prepare to defend 
iron mines in north, mountain passages to inland Sweden and repel possible paratrooper drops on 
whole area. Swedish soldiers just witnessed struggle of ill-armed Norwegian army and speed of 
German Blitzkrieg and full air superiority which did not stop until hitting Narvik. Lack of air cover 
and enemy air superiority were weakness of Swedish defense which was generally known. Norwegian 
campaign was matter of prestige for Hitler who took personal interest in battle planning. Huge amount 
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of pressure lied on Swedish coalition government which was asked for concessions in form of 
horseshoe traffic reinforcement of Narvik battlefront. Ability to counter these demands to the form that 





Hitler viewed the stability and material base of the north-western wing as a priority even if it 
meant the invasion. That is why he ordered working out a plan called “Arctic Fox”
47
. Plan was 
prepared by general von Schnell.  It counted with the advance of German troops from Norway to the 
East where they should conquer Stockholm and destroy the Swedish forces that were concentrated in 
the North of the lake Vänern. The original plan counted with 17 divisions, two of which had to be 
armoured, 25
th
 armoured division was garrisoned in Norway and was supposed to lead attack. Because 
of the needs of the Eastern line, Germany was not able to provide such resources for the capture of 
Sweden. Germany also counted with the fact that more than 70% of the officers are pro-German. 
However, Swedish soldiers would have had the advance of knowing the domestic terrain and of 
civilian sympathies. On the other hand, Sweden would be directly threatened by Luftwaffe attacks 
which would in case of invasion be able to endanger all big cities without any problem. 
 
German report from 1941 stated that Swedes could deploy in 48 hours two divisions in north 
to protect iron ore mines. Weakness was in amount of supplies stored in Sweden. Coal and fuel oil 
would be in case of total blockade scarce. British expectancy was two weeks of resistance, Swedish 
expected three months due to saving and proper distribution of supplies. Germans reported re-armed 
and trained soldiers in 1943 but lacking heavy anti-air and artillery capability, tanks and air-force. 
Also soldiers lacked any form of combat experience. Swedish coast was well defended by 210 mm 
guns with 30 kilometre firing range. The long borderline with Norway went through the Scandinavian 
Mountains which meant that the infantry and armoured attack could be led only through mountain 
passes that were easy to defend. During the mobilisation training in autumn 1943, Sweden mobilised 
half a million of soldiers in infantry divisions, armoured and motorised brigades, cavalry and artillery 
regiments. The border was defended by anti-aircraft and anti-tank batteries with 105 mm artillery and 




Swedish strengths were in infantry training in combat in adverse terrain. Infantry could be 
deployed similarly as in Finland. Plan prepared by general von Schnell was focused on armoured 
thrust through open plains using tanks and motorized infantry supported by Luftwaffe. They planned 
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to move in two directions, from Trondheim to Sundsvall on east coast and from southern borders 
through southern Sweden to Stockholm supported by landings from Finland. This scenario was very 
possible in April 1943. Preventive attack on Sweden will prevent the army to join allied landings in 
Norway that was expected. Although invasion plan on Sweden could be executed without excuse of 
allied landings, German forces never built up so they could launch invasion. 
 
Hitler was discouraged from attacking Sweden by the problems with Norwegian campaign, the 
concern about the preparedness of Swedish army and by the resistance of Swedish population. 
Because of a new combat line opened in Italy, German troops were transferred to Italy and France and 
the plan to invade Sweden was abandoned. Thanks to this international development, Swedish army 





Phase Four: From the Landings of Allies in Italy in 1943 to the First 
Half of 1944 
 
 Since the turning point in the war, Swedish government inclined more and more towards the 
Allies. After the concern about German attack was eased down, Sweden informed Germany about 
stopping the “leave traffic” and the mutual relationships worsened. Germans started to attack Swedish 
courier planes and ships. 
 
Swedish export to Germany could finally be limited as the Allies demanded because the threat 
of Germany started to diminish and Sweden managed to gather some reserves during previous years. 
Thanks to its neutrality and German dependence on its export, Sweden could help to shorten the war 
with economic sanctions. While in 1943 Sweden sent 10 200 000 tons of iron ore to Germany, in 1944 
it was only 7 100 000 tons. In 1943, Sweden exported ball bearings worth 15 000 000 dollars, in 1944 
it was only 7 500 000 dollars and on 13th June 1944 only 20% of the military export
50
. This dramatic 
change was sped up by the opening of the Western front in Normandy, as well as by the advancement 
of the Soviet troops in the East. In the last years of war, Sweden provided their support to the Allies, 
for the benefit of which they infringed their neutrality again. It provided Britain with intelligence 
information; they sold the plans of a crashed V-2 missile and enabled the building of a British radio 
station on Swedish territory
51
.  
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By preserving its neutrality and not taking part in the war, Sweden not only helped to speed up 
the end of the war but also effectively supported the advancement of the Allies through Europe. 
Sweden also functioned as an island of freedom in Europe controlled by Nazis. This fourth phase can 
be seen as a transition period of balanced neutrality that in the first half of 1944 developed to 
neutrality inclined towards the Allies. During this period, the result of the conflict was not yet clear, 
even though after the battle at Kursk and the fall of Mussolini‟s regime in Italy, Sweden started to 
reduce the compromises and the level of mutual trade with Germany. The agreement about transport 
and German using of Swedish railways was terminated and at the end of 1943, Sweden was open to 






Sweden’s Aid to Its Neighbours 
 
 In general, Sweden justifies its neutrality by humanitarian actions during the entire period and 
by accepting refugees. The fact that a country in Nazi occupied Europe accepted refugees, saved 
thousands of lives, mainly a great part of Danish and Norwegian Jewish community. During the air 
raids in German cities, the pilots that were shot down could seek asylum in the country. Refugees were 
coming during the whole conflict, especially after beginning of Operation „Wesserübung”, as well as 
the Winter War. 
 
Sweden provided asylum and support for example via the organization Svenska Norgehjälpen 
which provided material and nutrition aid to Norway since 1942. During the conflict, supplies and 
food were gathered in Swedish storages to be sent to its neighbours immediately after the hostilities 
ceased. Sweden also declared its own form of Marshall Plan for Scandinavia with which it helped to 
start the after-war recovery and it lent 150 million Swedish Crowns to Norway.
53
 Norwegians and 
Danes went to Canada through Sweden or they stayed there and were trained as police that was 
supposed to keep order in their countries after the withdrawal of Wehrmacht. These police forces 
underwent, among other things, also artillery training. Swedish diplomats achieved important 
humanitarian goals, such as the active participation of Swedish ambassador in Budapest, Raoul 
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Wallenberg, in rescuing Hungarian Jews, or Duke Folke Bernadotte who negotiated with Germany the 




After the war ended, Sweden actively participated in the recovery of Europe. For example, it 
reconstructed the Gdansk harbour in exchange for Polish coal
55
. Swedish shipyards that were not 




Phase Five: From the Second Half of 1944 to the End of War in 1945 
 
 
 The last phase of Swedish neutrality started in the half of 1944 that was most distinctively 
influenced by the Normandy landings and that foresaw the loss of Germany. Swedish neutrality 
inclined more and more towards the Allies and the West. This tendency was most visible in limitations 
of Swedish-German trade. The Allies demanded its limitation as well as termination of trade 
agreements. In September, Swedish harbours in the Baltic Sea closed down to German trade and all 




The capitulation of Germany brought to an end incongruent and often discussed period of 
Swedish history. Thanks to the preservation of production capacities and with the help of its industry, 
Sweden played an important role in the after-war recovery of Europe. It also represented a guarantor 
of stability in northern Europe. Social unrest and advancing influence of communism from the Soviet 
Union did not particularly affect this region, except Finland. This development predicted the future 
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Evaluation of the Neutrality Policy 
 
 
 Despite the fact that King Gustav V. was distinctively pro-German during World War I, 
during World War II he actively promoted the preservation of neutrality and avoiding the military 
conflict. The neutrality policy was Swedish goal and a result of consensus within Swedish society.  
 
By the analysis of the economic situation, pre-war international politics and the politics within 
the League of Nations, I tried to explain why Sweden decided for the course of military non-
intervention, even though the fights took place close to its borders. It supported its neighbours only 
materially, humanitarianly and diplomatically. After the collective security system failed, Sweden was 
in the state of disillusioned isolationism, disappointed by the attitude of the powers and by the policy 
of appeasement. After 1938, Sweden withdrawn from the international organizations and decided to 
rely on its armed neutrality. Why should it participate in a conflict that it did not cause and that it tried 
to avert at all costs? Why should Sweden help its neighbours that were not prepared for the conflict, 
therefore it was resolved from beginning? In any case, the Allies benefited from Swedish neutrality 
more than Germany. The necessity to trade with iron ore and ball bearings enabled Swedish 
government at least regulate this exchange of goods and materials. If Sweden had been occupied, these 
resources would have probably been destroyed by Sweden itself or by Great Britain or decimated 
because of German military needs and Swedish industry that was crucial for the after-war recovery of 
Europe would not have existed. The civil population would have suffered from the shortage of 
reserves, coal for heating and food. Sweden undoubtedly contributed to the ending of the war with big 
part, despite of their trade links with Germany. If Sweden had participated in fighting, militarily 
opposed Germany, and paralysed a part of German army, would this strategy have been more 
beneficial for the ending of the war than the policies that Sweden pursued? The fact is that Swedish 
army was not large; it could fight for a longer period of time because of the geographic character of 
the country but Sweden itself would not oppose Germany for long.  It was dependent on import which 
made it vulnerable in the case of blockade. Even though Sweden disposed of high quality anti-aircraft 
arsenal, Bofors guns
57
, German aircraft superiority and the closeness of German aircraft bases made 
Swedish cities easy targets for air-based attack. Sweden provided the Allies with intelligence 
information, as well as the certainty that Northern Europe would remain stable and that social unrest 
or even communist coups as in other parts of Europe would not occur there. 
 
Keeping Sweden out of World War II was not strictly a result of neutrality but more of 
pragmatic policy that often crossed the limits of the Hague Convention. Swedish politicians who 
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respected laws and international agreements, were facing an immense power controlling Europe and to 
save their country, they had to go beyond the conventions. 
 
Second World War never became part of the national memory of Swedes mainly because there 
weren‟t any material or human losses. There wasn‟t any turning-point in history as were in other 
belligerent states. Consensus is that Sweden deviated from neutrality; but it kept resistant policy 
towards Germany and this allowed it to contribute to major effort for peace and after-war 
reconstruction. However, memory of performance during war is problematic even nowadays. There 
are arguments that support realpolitik of Swedish government which occurred in 1940‟s and persisted 
during whole Cold war era. Johan Östling characterizes this policy as small-state realistic narrative
58
. 
It combines realpolitik of small state economically tied to its neighbors and threatened by Nazi 
Germany in the first place. Aiming this policy to preserve nation, their neighbors and peace itself, 
historians were justifying its performance from World War II during post-war and whole Cold war era 
years. There were many researches that used this dominant narrative as background to their work; 
which often served as support of Cold war small-state realism and neutrality which was undergoing in 
Sweden. There were created many complex works mainly in Swedish language to boost national 
memory such as Stockholm‟s Department of History‟s research „Sveriges under andra Världskriget‟ 
(SUAV, „Sweden during the Second World War‟) or „Svensk urikespolitik‟ („Swedish foreign policy 
1939-1945„) by Wilhelm M. Carlgren. Pragmatic policy played major role in works of this era, 
morality of politics was only touched but never fully developed as topic. 
 
Counter narratives occurred sporadically and they failed to establish serious opposition to 
small-state realism concept. They rejected small-state realism in general and accused Swedish 
government of unscrupulous pragmatism; they were based only on moral values and not on power 
politics. These were arguments of anti-Nazis such as Torgny Segerstedt or Amelie Posse- Brázdová. 
They accused Swedish government of not seeing a bigger picture of the whole war- a moral struggle 
between good and evil, between democracy and dictatorship. Other counter-narratives were from 
Communist and ultra-nationalist point of view. 
  
Communists criticized Swedish Germanophilia through upper class and endorsed role of 
Soviet Union in result of the war. But unlike in other west European countries, this counter-narrative 
was never forged in any serious actions and did not had any serious impact on society. 
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Ultra-nationalists focused on anti-Communism, royalism and patriotism. They were able to 
develop most genuine counter-narrative contrary to small-state realism narrative but they were 
scarcely supported and were just a reminder of era that ended in 1945. 
 
Small-state narrative began to be challenged after collapse of the Soviet Union. End of an era 
and chance to self-examine themselves in late 1980s allowed a shift in narratives to the self-criticism 
which started with „Helder och samvete‟ („Honour and conscience‟) by Maria-Pia Boëthius, followed 
by Alf E. Johansson, SUAV co-author and his reconsideration of small-state realism. Narrative 
became focused on morality and Holocaust. It did not blindly follow perspective of coalition 
government from war era. National sovereignty gave way to international commitment and caused a 
healthy wave of self-examination and recapitulation of history. 
 
Nevertheless, in 2005 Prime Minister Göran Persson returned to small-state realism when he 
refused to apologize for actions of government during war in Moscow on Victory Day on sixtieth 
anniversary. Since then, there are two narratives in Swedish society and it still causes many questions, 




I used references from Nordic narratives because I had no possibility to work with these 
publications mainly because they are in Swedish so I enclosed references for further interest of reader. 
Research of Swedish neutrality narratives could be next intresting step in development of topic of 
Swedish neutrality. In my personal opinion, based on datas I had encountered during research for this 
tesis, I think that Swedish leaders did as much as they could to prevent war and even to stabilise whole 
region. There was of course some opportunistic behaviour, mainly in economic and trade sphere but if 
we are evaluating foreign policy we can assume that outcome was success. Neutrality in form shaped 
by Swedes during the Second World War had achieved its objectives compared to form of strict 
neutralitydefined by Hague Convention from 1907. 
 
Many people, Europeans and Americans, viewed Swedes as collaborators. However, Swedes 
had to put up with shortages and fear of war as well
60
. The evidence stated above clearly indicates that 
despite the conflicting questions, we may consider Swedish neutrality to be justified. Swedish society 
has changed after the war. Sweden paid back most of its foreign loans; it had strong industry and 
democratic government. The whole society with all its classes came together to protect the country and 
to support the government course. People became more emphatic and were able to be satisfied with 
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less which helped the acceptance of higher government expenses to recover the country and to invest 
in the world. This public consensus enabled the further development of the social situation and social 
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